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tHe minamata convention on mercury:
Past, Present, and future environmental HealtH
by Maggie Coulter*
InTroducTIon
In October 2013, nearly six decades after health officials first noted victims suffering from unregulated discharges of methylmercury in Minamata, Japan, parties signed the Mer-
cury Convention.1 An international treaty designed to protect 
human health and the environment from anthropogenic releases 
and emissions of mercury and mercury compounds, the Mina-
mata Convention on Mercury is the newest multilateral environ-
mental agreement registered with the United Nations.2 Currently, 
the Convention has 96 signatories and only one ratified party, the 
United States.3 When it enters into force, however, the costs and 
difficulty of implementation may dilute the benefits of this new 
global monitoring system. This feature describes the origins of 
the Convention and potential implementation problems and con-
cludes that despite these difficulties, the creation of a global risk 
assessment for mercury, if properly implemented, will be invalu-
able in protecting environmental health worldwide.
orIgIns
The negative human health effects of mercury contami-
nation and poisoning have been well-documented since the 
1970s.4 But not until the occurrence of large-scale public health 
catastrophes did the global community gain awareness of this 
issue. The emergence of a strange and un-diagnosable ailment 
in the fishing village of Minamata, Japan in 1956 which came 
to be known as “Minamata disease” was the first and most well-
known of the mercury-caused public health emergencies that 
emerged over time.5 For many years, however, the cause of this 
“disease” was unknown; there is much controversy regarding 
the Japanese government’s response to the outbreak of this “dis-
ease.” It was not until 25 years after the first outbreak that the 
Japanese government finally acknowledged that releases of an 
unwanted byproduct (methylmercury) of chemicals manufactur-
ing offshore into the ocean by the Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo 
chemical plant were the source of the mysterious ailments that 
afflicted the community.6
Victims of Minamata disease who ingested the methylmer-
cury—a potent neurotoxin now known to accumulate into highly 
toxic doses in the food chain7 and cause brain damage and birth 
defects8—have struggled to get the Japanese government to 
recognize the pollution disaster as well as obtain compensation 
from the polluting chemical facility.9 As of March 2001, 2,265 
victims have been officially recognized by the Japanese govern-
ment (of whom 1,784 have died) and over 10,000 people received 
financial compensation from Chisso.10 The number of victims, 
however, varies widely between reporting in government sources 
and the studies conducted by the local community. Further, 
calculating the number of victims to begin with is even more 
difficult because symptoms of mercury poisoning often do not 
manifest until later in life, and varying degrees of affliction 
result from varying levels of exposure.11
In the village of Minamata two different museums docu-
menting and memorializing the public health catastrophe portray 
vastly different pictures of Minamata disease, one reflecting the 
government perspective, the other the villagers’.12 Further evi-
dence of the distance between local and government perspectives 
on mercury poisoning in Minamata is the fact that the Japanese 
government lobbied aggressively to have the new mercury treaty 
bear the name of the village, whereas the villagers in Minamata 
vehemently opposed including their city’s name in the title.13
FuTure research and daTa collecTIon
The Minamata Convention on Mercury is a multilateral 
environmental agreement designed to regulate and reduce 
anthropogenic emissions and releases of mercury primarily to 
prevent public health catastrophes like that which occurred in 
Minamata, Japan.14 The treaty’s goals include “curbing mercury 
emissions from coal-fired power plants and industrial facilities, 
phasing out by 2020 many consumer products that contain mer-
cury, “phasing down” the use of mercury in dental amalgams, 
and closing all mercury mines within 15 years after the conven-
tion takes effect.”15 Many of the convention’s goals, however, are 
essentially voluntary, qualified by the phrase “where feasible,”16 
which may prevent attainment of these goals. Going forward, 
the Convention does place significant emphasis on research and 
information sharing among parties with emphasis on clarify-
ing how mercury enters and moves through the environment.17 
Recently emerging scientific evidence that global climate change 
and ozone depletion compound the effects of methymercury 
concentration further complicates this question.18
mInImaTa: a gloBal rIsk assessmenT Tool?
One important benefit of a global monitoring system for 
methylmercury assessment is that data from less developed or 
poorer countries will be taken to bear when determining global 
risk of pollutant exposure.19 For instance, impacts on fishermen 
in small villages like Minamata where methylmercury accu-
mulation in fish and ocean sediment cause greater instances of 
poisoning will be incorporated into risk assessments by national 
governments and larger chemical corporations. Additionally, 
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a global risk assessment will bring many different sources of 
pollution together in one analysis. For methylmercury, this 
is particularly important since initial emissions (such as the 
discharge of effluent waste by the Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo 
chemical plant) is often less detrimental than the re-emission 
of accumulated pollutants from the atmosphere or ocean sedi-
ment.20 Last, a global assessment would address the interplay of 
global problems like climate change and the deterioration of the 
earth’s ozone layer with methylmercury pollution.21 As global 
warming and ozone deterioration compounds methylmercury 
issues, a global assessment can better address the accumulation 
of methylmercury pollution.22
The largest problems Parties of the Mercury Convention 
will face are those of implementation.23 First, Party-states must 
supply all data collected under the forthcoming regime to a 
secretariat of the Convention, after which the data must be veri-
fied.24 This “trust but verify” implementation has the advantage 
of a dual layer of accountability, but has the disadvantage of 
redundancy.25 The consequent implementation of national moni-
toring systems and then a second layer of independent, unbiased 
monitoring will vastly increase its cost. Further, many of the 
existing data collection systems are outdated even in devel-
oped countries or simply do not yet exist in poorer countries.26 
Adapting existing monitoring technology, as well as developing 
new technologies where they are lacking will come at a signifi-
cant cost.27 Moreover, though the Convention includes language 
that calls on wealthier nations to assist poorer ones to aid in 
developing their data-gathering capacities, as of yet there is no 
concrete fund-sharing program.28
The final disadvantage of the Minamata Convention’s global 
assessment lies in determining what the new data-collection 
regime will actually measure.29 Which populations it should 
measure requires choosing between poor populations with 
high exposure rates where data collection is expensive and 
already established collection centers in developed countries.30 
Additionally, which sources of mercury pollution should 
be measured range from volcanoes, direct pollution like the 
effluent from the Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo chemical plant 
in Minamata, and even more nebulous re-emissions.31 Finally, 
further research regarding the type of human measurements is 
necessary.32 Choices range from more invasive blood collection 
and analysis, to less invasive breast milk and urine sampling.33 
In all instances, however, Convention implementers must choose 
and then employ collection methods uniformly. And although 
the implementing Parties of the Convention can look to other 
successful pollutant-based conventions for guidance, like the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants which 
addresses ozone depletion, mercury pollution presents unique 
issues all its own which will require even more uniquely tailored 
responses.34
conclusIons
The benefits of the Minamata Convention’s global monitor-
ing system are few but important when compared to the dif-
ficulty and expense of implementation. Access to a global risk 
assessment is essential in determining a sound, science-based 
global policy on mercury pollution. If the expense and dif-
ficulties of implementation can be overcome, a global assess-
ment is a valuable tool for creating policy, particularly one that 
must be streamlined across the globe in order to be effective. 
Reflecting on the global data-collection regime of the Stockholm 
Convention, the significant successes of such a global risk 
assessment reflect that future use of such a tool, if properly and 
effectively implemented, is invaluable.
Effective global implementation of the Minamata 
Convention, however, will also need to rely on state-specific and 
local policy development which may be obscured in a global risk 
assessment. Proper implementation cannot discount the impor-
tance of state-specific responses to pollution on a local level. 
Combining both local data collection and a global risk assess-
ment will be essential for the Parties to effectively implement the 
global data collection and assessment regime envisioned by the 
Minamata Convention. 
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